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RECENT CASE NOTES

character of these
In spite of the reasonable, judicious, and conclusive
24
arguments, in 1927 Indiana by State v. Shumaker 20overruled the well
reasoned cases of Cheadle v. State2 5 and Zuver v. State to decide that any
published disagreement with recent decisions is contemptuous, if similar cases
may arise in the future. By this decision Indiana reverted to the old common law rule in entire disregard of freedom of speech and press. Following the principle, "that criticism of past cases is prohibited because there
are pending cases involving the same general principle of law," to its logical
conclusion practically put an end to the freedom of speech and liberty of
the press as far as the court, judges, and their decisions were concerned.
And this rule of judicial tyranny obtained until the instant case was decided. By the rule of the instant case Indiana has returned to the majority
view and the more sane basis of recognizing criminal contempt only where
there is a case pending. It is to be regretted that nowhere in the opinion
of the court is the Shumaker case referred to, or the law of that case
expressly overruled. Ignoring this precedent is scarcely overruling it.
However, having returned to its earlier position, it is to be hoped that the
court will adhere to its rule. As indicated above, considerable reform is
still wanting in indirect criminal contempt proceedings where a case is pending. The courts should exercise a wise restraint and put a voluntary limitation upon themselves2 7 to give the accused the privilege of a jury, the depunishment
fense of truth, and a trial before another judge in the case of
28
for indirect criminal contempt when there is a case pending.
C. Z. B.

Corporations-Contractsby Foreign Corporations Before Compliance
with Statutes Governing Admission-Validity. Action to quiet title to real
estate alleged to belong to appellant. On January 15, 1929, the appellant, in
consideration of $24, executed a right of way agreement to the appellee to
operate, lay, maintain and remove a pipe line across the land of appellant.
And on February 21, 1929, over the same land, the appellant, in consideration of $10, executed a right of way agreement to the appellee for the
purpose of erecting, maintaining and removing telephone and telegraph poles
and the necessary wires and fixtures. Appellant contends that the foregoing contracts were void for the reason that appellee was a foreign corporation and had not complied with the Indiana law with reference to admission
of foreign corporation to do business in Indiana. It is shown, however,
See
24 (1927), 200 Ind. 623, 157 N. *E. 769, 162 N. E. 441, 163 N. E. 272.
criticisms of this case in (1927) 3 Ind. L. J. 149; (1927) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 254;
(1927) 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 210; (1928) 8 B. U. L. Rev. 59; (1928) 14 Va. L. Rev.
227; (1928) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 440.
2r, (1887), 110 Ind. 301, 11 N. E. 526.
20 (1919), 188 Ind. 60, 121 N. E. 828.
27 Cooke v. United States (1925), 267 U. S. 517. The United States Supreme
Court might accomplish this reform by holding that it is not due process of law
to punish for indirect contempt without these privileges.
Legislatures cannot put such restrictions upon the courts for the reason- that
courts hold that the power to punish for contempt is an inherent power of the
courts, and therefore under our doctrine of separation of powers that it is unconstitutional for legislatures to take this power away from courts created by constitutions. See Hale v. State (1896), 55 Ohio St. 210; Carter v. Commonwealth
(1899), 96 Va. 791; Little v. State (1883), 90 Ind. 338.
28 Hugh E. Willis, "Punishment for Contempt of Court," (1927) 2 Ind. L. J.
312-313.
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that appellee complied with the said law on April 1, 1929, prior to the commencement of this action. Held, that the contracts were not void and since
the appellee had complied with the law prior to the commencement of this
suit, they were enforceable agreements.1
The decisions are in a state of irreconcilable conflict upon the question
whether the failure of a foreign corporation to comply with restrictive
statutes before undertaking to do business in the domestic state, will render
its contracts, made in the state, void or voidable. Often the decisions are
only apparently in conflict due to the statutory or constitutional provisions
on which they are based. The statutes of a few states make contracts, such
as those under consideration, void by express terms.2 The Indiana statute,
however, makes no express or implied declarations respecting the validity
or enforceability of such contracts. There is to be found only a penalty
and a prohibition in regards to the maintenance of any suit at law or equity,
whether arising out of contract or tort in any court in this state.3
The Indiana cases themselves have been by no means in harmonious
accord, and a review of them shows a profound confusion. It is utterly impossible to reconcile them. In the case of Rising Sun Insurance Co. v.
Slaughter 4 it was held that a policy of insurance negotiated in this state by
a foreign insurance company without a previous compliance with the requirements of the act was void. But this case was in effect overruled by
two later cases. 5 In the case of Wood Mowing etc. Co. v. Caldwell 6 the
case first above named is expressly recognized as being overruled by the
two subsequent cases, but notwithstanding this fact it was again cited with
approval in the case of Cassady v. American Insurance Co. 7 The court laid
down the rule in Sandage v. Studabaker s that there could be no recovery
on a contract made in violation of a statute as between the parties thereto,
the violation of which is prohibited by a penalty, even though the statute
does not pronounce the contract void nor expressly prohibits the same.
This case, however, was probably the first one in Indiana holding that such
contracts were void because the statute makes the act of such corporation
a crime. An Illinois case 9 was cited in support of the above holding. This
latter case does not appear to be well considered and is based upon a former
Illinois case 10 which was not in point. Just three years before the Sandage
case the court had held that contracts of foreign unqualified corporations
were not void, but that the right of the corporation to enforce such contracts was suspended until it had complied with the terms of the statute."
The principal case relies upon the Indiana case of Peter and Burghard
Stone Co. v. Carper. 12 This latter case was exceedingly well reasoned and
follows the weight of authority. In numerous decisions the Federal courts
1Sleph v. Illinois Pipe Line (May 3, 1934), - Ind. -, 3 Ind. Adv. Rep. 308.
Smith Rolfe v. Wallace (1914), 41 Okla. 43, 139 P. 248; Kent, etc., Co. v.
Tuttle (1897), 20 Mont. 203, 50 P. 559.
3 Baldwin's Indiana Statutes (1934), sec. 4972.
4 Rising Sun Insurance Co. v. Slaughter (1863), 20 Ind. 502.
5 Deming v. State (1864), 23 Ind. 416; New England Fire Insurance Co. v.
Robinson (1865), 25 Ind. 536.
d Wood Mowing, etc., Co. v. Caldwell (1876), 54 Ind. 270.
7 Cassaday v. American Insurance Co. (1880), 72 Ind. 95.
8 Sandage v. Studabaker, etc. (1895), 142 Ind. 148, 41 N. E. 380.
9 U. S. Lead Co. v. J. W. Rudy, etc., Co. (1906), 222 Ill. 199, 78 N. E. 567.
10 Cincinnati, etc., Assurance Co. v. Rosenthal (1870), 55 Ill. 85, 8 Am. Rep.
626.
11 Phenix Insurance Co. v. Penn. R. R. Co. (1892), 134 Ind. 215, 33 N. E. 970.
12 Peter & Burghard Stone Co. v. Carper (1930), 172 N. E. 319.
2
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have held that such contracts are not void in the absence of a statute expressly making them so.13
The whole propositibn, of course, depends upon the wording of the
statutes and the interpretation the courts have given to them. Roughly,
however, the statutes can be placed into three categories; first, those declaring contracts of unqualified corporations as being totally void; second, those
declaring that such corporations shall do no business in the state without
complying with the terms of the statute, without declaring any penalty for
failure to comply with the statute; third, those declaring certain penalties
for failure to comply with the statute. The cases under the first class
need no discussion. As to the second class it has generally been held that
contracts made in contravention to it are void. 14 It was pointed out in
Thompson v. Building and Loan Association 15 that unless such contracts
were held to be void, the statute would be of no effect. Where the statute
provides for a penalty this objection is overcome. It is not for the judiciary
to inflict additional and harsh penalties. Consequently, holding a contract
void when a penalty is provided for cannot be justified. So it was said by
the United States Supreme Court that if the legislature had intended to
declare all contracts made by a foreign corporation doing business without
complying with the law void, it could, by appropriate words, have easily
and clearly expressed that intention. 1 Many courts adhere to this view.17
The principal case has perhaps settled the law in Indiana on this point;
and not only has it accepted the better view, but also has followed the
L.E.B.
weight of authority.
Public Service Commission-Prevention of Enforcement of 'Commission's Orders by Courts. On December 27, 1929, upon petition of the
appellant, the Public Service Commission of Indiana made an order fixing
and increasing the rates to be charged the public for appellant's telephone
service. Within thirty days thereafter, appellees instituted this action to
enjoin the operation of the order. Issues were formed, there was a trial by
the court, and a decree was entered enjoining the rates fixed by the order
as unreasonable and unlawful. Appellants assigned as error on appeal the
overruling of their motions to make more specific and their demurrers to
the complaint, all based on the theory that the action of appellees constituted
a collateral attack upon the commission's order, which could be made only
if the order was wholly void. Held, that the court's power to enjoin unreasonable administrative or legislative orders or regulations is not derived from
statute, but exists through and under the Constitution; and that in passing
on orders of the Public Service Commission, court does not review for
error, since commission acts ministerially and court, judicially.'
13 David Lupton's Son Co. v. Automobile Club (1912), 225 U. S. 489, 56
L. Ed. 1177; Louis Ilfield Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co. (C. C. A. 1927), 23 F. (2nd) 65;
Johnson v. New York, etc. (C. C. A. 1910), 178 F. 513; Ockenfels v. Boyd (C. C.
A. 1927), 297 F. 614.
14 Reliance Mut. Insurance Co. v. Sawyer (1897), 160 Mass. 413, 36 N. E. 59;
Haverhill Insurance Co. v. Prescott (1861), 42 N. H. 547, 80 Am. D. 123.
1 Thompson v. National Mut. Building and Loan Association (1905), 57 W.
Va. 551, 50 S. E. 756.
16 Fritts v. Palmer (1889), 132 U. S. 281, 33 L. Ed. 317.
17 Neuchatel Asphalt Co. v. New York (1898), 155 N. Y. 373, 49 N. E. 1043;
Ward Land, etc., Co. v. Mapes (1905), 147 Cal. 747, 82 P. 426; Brewing Co. v.
Grimes (1899), 173 Mass. 252, 53 N. E. 855; Despres v. Zieleyn (1910), 163 Mich.
399, 128 N. W. 769.
Ind. -, 193
1 Public Service Commission v. City of LaPorte (1935), N. E. 668.

